

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0920

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AMEMBASSY BONN

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0138

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS DEFENSE

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: SPECIFYING COMMON CEILING LEVEL IN PHASE I

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE FEBRUARY 27-28 TRILATERAL MEETING ON OPTION 3, THE UK SUGGESTED THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD REQUEST EASTERN AGREEMENT TO A SPECIFIC COMMON CEILING FIGURE IN PHASE I AT THE SAME TIME THE ALLIES PUT FORWARD OPTION 3. IN THIS MESSAGE, THE DELEGATION ANALYZES THE UK SUGGESTION. WE CONCLUDE THAT TO ADD SUCH A REQUIREMENT TO ALLIED PHASE I OBJECTIVES WOULD BE DISADVANTAGEOUS BOTH FOR ALLIED AND FOR SPECIFIC US INTERESTS IN MBFR. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FYI SECTIONS, THE ANALYSIS BELOW HAS BEEN FORMULATED SO THAT IT COULD ALSO BE DRAWN ON IN DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE WITH UK AND FRG OFFICIALS. THE ANALYSIS IN MBFR VIENNA 0494 (DATED DECEMBER 12, 1974) IS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES DISCUSSED HERE. END SUMMARY.

2. STATUS OF THE ISSUE: DURING THE FEBRUARY 27-28 TRI-LATERAL CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON, UK REP TICKELL INDICATED HE CONSIDERED THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD PRESS FOR EASTERN

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AGREEMENT TO A SPECIFIC COMMON CEILING FIGURE IN CONNECTION

WITH PUTTING FORWARD OPTION 3. AS REPORTED IN STATE 50372, TICKELL SAID THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT WAS TOO UNPRECISE A PHASE I GOAL AND THAT THE COMMON CEILING SHOULD THEREFORE BE DEFINED NUMERICALLY. HE STRESSED THAT THE TRADE OF OPTION 3 FOR EASTERN AGREEMENT TO A NUMERICALLY DEFINED COMMON CEILING IN PHASE I WOULD PROVIDE A FAVORABLE PHASE II EFFECT BY ACHIEVING A NUMERICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE SECOND PHASE.

3. BACKGROUND: THE WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS PROPOSED PHASE I AGREEMENT ON THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING. IT DID NOT MAKE AGREEMENT TO A SPECIFIC COMMON CEILING LEVEL, A REQUIREMENT IN PHASE I. RATHER, IT SAID THAT THE COMMON CEILING "SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES. THIS CEILING MIGHT BE SET AT APPROXIMATELY 700,000 SOLDIERS ON EACH SIDE."

4. IN PRACTICE, THE ALLIES HAVE LEFT IT OPTIONAL WHETHER THIS WOULD BE DONE IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT. ALLIED REPS HAVE BEEN CAREFUL TO MAINTAIN THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT AND A PRE-CONDITION FOR NON-US ALLIED REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II, AND THE 700,000 FIGURE, AS A "SUGGESTION" OR "ILLUSTRATION" OF THE RESIDUAL LEVEL ENVISAGED BY THE ALLIES FOR PHASE II. IN RESPONSE TO EASTERN CRITICISMS OF THE ALLIED APPROACH, ALLIED REPS HAVE ALSO OFFERED TO AGREE IN PHASE I ON A SPECIFIC COMMON CEILING LEVEL, IF THE EAST SO DESIRED.

5. THERE FOLLOWS A DISCUSSION OF THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF PROPOSING AGREEMENT TO THE 700,000 FIGURE IN PHASE I AT THE SAME TIME THE ALLIES INTRODUCE OPTION 3.

ADVANTAGES.

6. IF THE EAST AGREED TO THIS PROPOSAL, THE ALLIES WOULD GAIN THE BENEFITS THAT THE EAST WOULD HAVE AGREED ON THE TOTAL REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EACH SIDE AND THAT TOTAL EASTERN REDUCTIONS WILL BE MUCH LARGER THAN WESTERN ONES.

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7. NATO HAS DETERMINED THAT IT CANNOT AFFORD TO REDUCE MORE THAN 10 PERCENT OF ITS MANPOWER. AS UK OFFICIALS HAVE POINTED OUT, ANOTHER POSSIBLE BENEFIT IS THAT PHASE I AGREEMENT ON A 700,000 FIGURE FOR THE COMMON CEILING WOULD RULE OUT POSSIBLE EASTERN ATTEMPTS IN PHASE II TO SEEK LARGER REDUCTIONS -- SAY DOWN TO 500,000 FOR EACH SIDE. HOWEVER, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROBABLE

THAT EASTERN POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS WOULD
CONSENT TO PROPOSING SUCH AN OUTCOME FOR FEAR THAT
REDUCTIONS OF THIS MAGNITUDE WOULD HAVE DESTABILIZING
POLITICAL EFFECTS WITHIN EASTERN EUROPE.

8. HOWEVER, EASTERN AGREEMENT TO A SPECIFIC COMMON CEILING
LEVEL MIGHT NOT BRING MUCH INCREMENTAL GAIN TO THE WEST
ALTHOUGH THE COSTS OF SECURING EASTERN AGREEMENT MIGHT
NONETHELESS BE HIGH.

9. IF RESIDUAL NATO-WARSAW PACT FORCE TOTALS FOLLOWING
IMPLEMENTATION OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT ARE INCLUDED IN THE
TEXT OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT AND THE EAST HAD AGREED IN
PHASE I SOLELY TO THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING
WITHOUT THE LEVEL HAVING BEEN SPECIFIED, THEN THE EAST
WOULD AT A MINIMUM BE COMMITTED IN PHASE II TO ELIMINATING
ITS REMAINING ADVANTAGE IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.
THE WEST WOULD IN THIS WAY BE ABLE TO OBTAIN THE MAIN BENEFIT
OF SETTING A SPECIFIC FIGURE FOR THE COMMON CEILING AS
REGARDS LARGER EASTERN REDUCTIONS WITHOUT RAISING A
SPECIFIC REQUEST ON THIS POINT AND PAYING AN ADDITIONAL
PRICE FOR IT.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DEFENSE.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0138

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FROM US REP MBFR

DISADVANTAGES OF PROPOSING AGREEMENT TO THE 700,000
FIGURE IN PHASE I

10. ASIDE FROM THESE POINTS, THERE ARE DISADVANTAGES
TO PUTTING FORWARD A PROPOSAL IN CONNECTION WITH TABLING
OPTION 3 TO SET THE COMMON CEILING AT A FIXED LEVEL.

A. THE MAJOR COST IS THAT TO REQUIRE EASTERN
AGREEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH ADVANCING OPTION 3 WOULD
MEAN THAT THE ALLIES WERE RAISING THEIR PHASE I DEMANDS
ON THE EAST. THIS IS CONTRARY TO THE US CONCEPT THAT THE
ALLIES SHOULD MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT PHASE I NEGOTIATING
OBJECTIVES WHILE ADDING A FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL INDUCE-
MENT (OPTION 3) TO OBTAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THOSE

OBJECTIVES. THIS IS THE DELEGATION'S PRINCIPAL OBJECT-
ION TO THE UK PROPOSAL.

B. FURTHER, THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT THE EAST, IF
CONFRONTED WITH SUCH A DEMAND, WOULD FOCUS THEIR
RESPONSE ON THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF A COMMON CEILING
AT 700,000 RATHER THAN ON THE MERITS OF OPTION 3 AS

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A MAKEWEIGHT FOR THE OTHER ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS
THE ALLIES DEMAND.

C. EASTERN REJECTION OF THE COMMON CEILING
CONCEPT IN SPECIFIC FORM WOULD MAKE IT MORE
DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN EASTERN PHASE I AGREEMENT TO THE
GENERAL CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING. IT WOULD
BE TACTICALLY SOUNDER
TO SEEK EASTERN AGREEMENT FIRST TO THE GENERAL CONCEPT,
AND IF THIS IS SUCCESSFUL, ONLY SUBSEQUENTLY TO THE
CONCEPT IN MORE SPECIFIC FORM.

D. BEGIN FYI: IF THE US ENTERS NOW INTO A COM-
MITMENT WITH ITS ALLIES TO OBTAIN SOVIET AGREEMENT TO
A SPECIFIC COMMON CEILING FIGURE, AS WELL AS
WITHDRAWAL OF A TANK ARMY, WITH OPTION 3. IT WOULD BE
DIFFICULT AT A LATER STAGE FOR THE US TO WITHDRAW
FROM THIS COMMITMENT. HAVING RAISED THEIR NEGOTIATING
DEMANDS ON THE EAST, IT WILL ALSO BE MORE DIFFICULT
FOR THE ALLIES CORPORATELY TO DROP THE 700,000
REQUIREMENT, SHOULD THAT APPEAR DESIRABLE.
END FYI.

11. IT IS LIKELY THAT OBTAINING EASTERN AGREEMENT
TO A COMMON CEILING SET A A SPECIFIC LEVEL IN PHASE

I WOULD ENTAIL HIGH COSTS FOR THE WEST. THIS IS BECAUSE EASTERN AGREEMENT IN PHASE I TO A SPECIFIC FIGURE FOR OVERALL PHASE II REDUCTIONS WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY ENTAIL NOT ONLY DISCUSSION OF, BUT ACTUAL EAST-WEST AGREEMENT IN PHASE I, ON A NUMBER OF VERY DIFFICULT ISSUES WHICH, UNDER THEIR PRESENT CONCEPT THE ALLIES HAVE DECIDED TO DEFER TO PHASE II. IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE EAST WILL IN ANY EVENT RAISE QUESTIONS ON THESE POINTS IN CONNECTION WITH ANY SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. BUT REQUIRING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO A COMMON CEILING AT A SPECIFIED LEVEL MAKES THE EASTERN COMMITMENT FAR MORE SPECIFIC, OR AT LEAST TO APPEAR SO. THIS MEANS IN TURN THAT THE EAST WILL ASK FOR CORRESPONDINGLY MORE SPECIFIC WESTERN COMMITMENTS ON
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THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

A. INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS
ON THE WESTERN SIDE:

B. WHAT CONSTITUTES A REDUCTION BY THE FRG:

C. HOW TO DISPOSE OF ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT OF
REDUCED UNITS OF FRG AND OTHER INDIGENOUS FORCES:

D. WHAT TYPES OF FORCES WILL BE REDUCED IN
PHASE II: I.E., WHETHER AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES WILL
BE INCLUDED:

E. THE SIZE OF SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II:

F. NATIONAL CEILINGS.

12. ON THE LATTER POINT, THE SOVIETS ARE UNLIKELY TO STOP PUSHING FOR A NATIONAL CEILING ON THE BUNDESWEHR. BUT IF DISCUSSION OF MAJOR PHASE II ISSUES COULD BE AVOIDED IN PHASE I, AND IF PHASE I REDUCTIONS ARE LIMITED TO US AND SOVIET FORCES ONLY, THERE IS AT LEAST A THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIETS COULD AGREE TO A COLLECTIVE CEILING ON NON-US ALLIED FORCES IN THE FORM OF A COLLECTIVE NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT, PENDING PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS. A PRACTICAL REQUIREMENT TO DECIDE ALL MAJOR PHASE II ISSUES IN PHASE I WOULD PROBABLY RULE OUT THIS POSSIBILITY.

13. THE EFFECT OF INTRODUCING THE ABOVE ISSUES WOULD

BE A GREATLY PROLONGED PHASE I NEGOTIATION DURING WHICH IT MIGHT BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO HOLD THE LINE AGAINST UNILATERAL WESTERN REDUCTIONS.

14. BEGIN FYI: EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST OF THESE DIFFICULT ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE WOULD IN PRACTICE ALSO PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT, TOWARD THE END OF PHASE I NEGOTIATIONS, THE ALLIES MIGHT, AS A LAST-MINUTE CONCESSION AIMED AT CLINCHING AN OTHERWISE
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SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT, DECIDE TO OFFER SMALL PHASE I WEST EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS IN A FORM THAT DID NOT PREJUDICE ALLIED POSITIONS IN PHASE II.

15. SUCH A PROPOSAL, MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, TAKE THE FORM OF A SYMBOLIC REDUCTION OF PERHAPS 5.000 ON EACH SIDE TO BE TAKEN BY THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN PHASE I, WITH INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION OF HTIS REDUCTION

TO BE ESTABLISHED BY EACH SIDE.

16. BECAUSE OF ITS LAST-MINUTE, SYMBOLIC NATURE, THIS COURSE MIGHT ENABLE THE ALLIES TO AVOID SERIOUS DISCUSSION ON THE CEILINGS DFFECTS OF THESE REDUCTIONS. BUT THE ALLIES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY FOLLOW THIS COURSE

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IF THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN TRYING TO REACH DECISIONS WITH THE EAST ON THE WHOLE EXTENT OF ISSUES INVOLVED IN WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING CEILINGS.

17. AS WE POINT OUT IN MBFR VIENNA 0494, IT WILL PROBABLY PROVE NECESSARY AT SOME POINT AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF OPTION 3 FOR THE ALLIES TO DECIDE EITHER TO NEGOTIATE ON CERTAIN MAJOR PHASE II ISSUES IN ORDER TO GAIN EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, OR TO DEFER FURTHER NEGOTIATION ON THE CONCEPT ITSELF TO PHASE II IF THE EASTERN PRICE APPEARS TOO HIGH. BUT THIS IS A DECISION WHICH THE ALLIES SHOULD TAKE AT A LATER POINT, AFTER THEY HAVE SEEN THE EASTERN REACTION TO OPTION 3. THIS DECISION WOULD NOT BE PREJUDICED EITHER WAY BY STICKING TO THE PRESENT COURSE OF SEEKING EASTERN COMMITMENT TO THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING, WITHOUT A SPECIFIC FIGURE. IT WOULD BE PREJUDICED BY INTRODUCING ALONG WITH OPTION 3 A DEMAND THAT THE EAST AGREE TO THE 700,000 FIGURE IN PHASE I AND MAKING THIS, BY AGREEMENT AMONG THE ALLIES, A REQUIRED ALLIED NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVE. END FYI.

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FURTHER DISADVANTAGES.

18. BECAUSE EASTERN AGREEMENT TO A SPECIFIC LEVEL OF THE COMMON CEILING WOULD PROBABLY ENTAIL EAST-WEST AGREEMENT IN PHASE I ON ALL THE MAJOR PHASE II ISSUES, IT WOULD HAVE THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF MERGING PHASE I AND PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS INTO A SINGLE NEGOTIATION PERHAPS WITH A PHASED IMPLEMENTATION.

19. BEYOND THE NEGOTIATING DISADVANTAGES DESCRIBED ABOVE, MERGING THE TWO PHASES WOULD MEAN AGREEING ON THE SIZE OF THE REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EACH PARTICIPANT IN BOTH PHASES. IN PARTICULAR, THE US REDUCTION WOULD BE INCREASED MATERIALLY BEYOND THE LEVEL PRESENTLY CONTEMPLATED FOR PHASE I.

AGREEMENT ON A LARGER US REDUCTION MIGHT HAVE AN ADVERSE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON WESTERN EUROPEAN OPINION. ON THE OTHER HAND, STRETCHING OUT US WITHDRAWALS OVER TWO PHASES OF NEGOTIATION AS PRESENTLY CONTEMPLATED WOULD ALLOW THE WEST EUROPEANS TIME TO ACCOMMODATE THEMSELVES TO THE IDEA OF LIMITED US WITHDRAWALS.

20. DESPITE THIS, THE COMBINED PHASE I-PHASE II US REDUCTION MIGHT ALSO BE ATTACKED IN THE US CONGRESS AS INSUFFICIENT. THE PRESENT ALLIED APPROACH PERMITS THE US ADMINISTRATION TO DEFER ITS FINAL DECISION ON THE SIZE OF FURTHER US REDUCTIONS IN A SECOND PHASE TO A LATER POINT WHEN PREPARATIONS FOR PHASE II ARE BEING MADE, THUS MAKING IT EASIER TO DEAL WITH CONTINUING CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURES FOR US REDUCTIONS.

21. TELESOPING THE PHASES INTO A SINGLE PHASE WOULD BE LESS EFFECTIVE THAN THE PRESENT ALLIED APPROACH IN CREATING A BUFFER AGAINST POSSIBLE PUBLIC PRESSURES IN THE WEST FOR REPEATING THE REDUCTION PROCESS IMMEDIATELY. SUCH PRESSURES WILL NOT BE SO LIKELY IF THE COMMON CEILING IS REACHED ONLY AFTER TWO SUCCESSIVE, ARDUOUS NEGOTIATIONS.

22. BEGIN FYI: A FURTHER DISADVANTAGE FOR THE US IS THAT,
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WHILE THERE MIGHT STILL BE MORE THAN ONE STAGE OF IMPLEMENTATION, IT IS LIKELY THAT MERGING THE PHASES MEANS AGREEING ON THE FULL QUOTA OF EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH US REDUCTIONS. THIS WOULD DILUTE THE BURDEN-SHIFTING IMPACT OF THE PHASES APPROACH IN ITS PRESENT FORM. END FYI.

CONCLUSIONS.

23. WE CONCLUDE THAT IT WOULD BE INADVISABLE FOR THE ALLIES TO PUT FORWARD A REQUIREMENT FOR FIXING THE NUMERICAL LEVEL OF A COMMON CEILING IN PHASE I AT THE SAME TIME THEY ADVANCE OPTION 3. IT IS UNDESIRABLE TO INTRODUCE A WESTERN REQUIREMENT THAT THE LEVEL OF THE COMMON CEILING BE SPECIFIED IN PHASE I BECAUSE OF THE ADVERSE EFFECT DOING SO WOULD HAVE ON THE EASTERN REACTION TO OPTION 3 AND THE COMPLICATIONS IT WOULD INTRODUCE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, THIS WOULD NOT PRECLUDE DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE WITH THE EAST LATER DURING PHASE I NEGOTIATIONS. EVEN UNDER THE PRESENT ALLIED APPROACH THERE WILL NEED TO BE DETAILED DISCUSSION DURING PHASE I NEGOTIATIONS OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. IF EASTERN REACTIONS TO SUCH

DISCUSSION ARE POSITIVE, THE ALLIES MIGHT THEN CONSIDER
PROPOSING AGREEMENT ON A SPECIFIC COMMON CEILING LEVEL.RESOR

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